What happens when investment grade bonds are downgraded to junk status? The received wisdom is that these fallen angels are sold by fixed income investors who, by regulation, are prohibited from investing substantial portions of their portfolios in speculative grade paper. Some may not be allowed to invest in such low-grade debt at all.
1 This view is well articulated by the New York Times in a discussion of turmoil in the subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market. 2 The Times suggests that these MBS bonds would experience further downgrades as the fallout continues, and when this happens, the concern is that "many mortgage buyers cannot hold securities that are rated below investment grade -insurance companies are an example. So if the securities were downgraded, forced selling would ensue, further pressuring an already beleaguered
[subprime] market."
Previous studies of the effects of fallen angel downgrades on the corporate bond market have largely focused on returns, asking the question "Are fallen angel corporate bonds a good investment?" The logic is that forced selling by regulated entities would allow other investors (such as high yield mutual funds) to pick up the bonds at bargain basement prices, therefore allowing them to earn positive excess returns (see Fridson and Cherry [1992] and Fridson [2005] ). Fridson and Cherry [1992] and Fridson and Sterling [2006, 2007] compare returns on fallen angels and original issue high yield bonds to determine if returns are higher for the former, as the conventional wisdom suggests.
While they find evidence that returns are higher for fallen angels, they do not attribute the superior performance to forced selling by regulated entities.
The previous focus on returns reflects the difficulty researchers have faced in tabulating selling activity. Few databases are available that would identify bond transactions in a sufficiently detailed manner that one could determine which firms were buying or selling fallen angels. Our study overcomes this hurdle by investigating insurance company trading activity around the time of the downgrade. Insurance companies must report their corporate bond trading activity to regulators, which allows us to determine the extent to which forced selling occurs. Insurance companies are likely to be among the most regulated of corporate bond investors: If the received wisdom is correct we should observe its effect in these data.
Insurance company regulations vary by the jurisdiction in which the firm is domiciled, but generally speaking they constrain holdings of high yield bonds along two dimensions. First, they may limit or outright prohibit investments in speculative-grade debt. 3 Second, risk-based capital (RBC) regulations force insurers to hold more capital (surplus) when they invest in riskier assets. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) categorizes corporate bonds according to six risk classes, with NAIC-1 being the safest class and NAIC-6 being the riskiest. The NAIC categories line up well with the rating agencies, so that a bond rated AAA is nearly always classified as NAIC-1 and a bond rated BBB is nearly always considered NAIC-2. Insurers that restrict their assets to these two categories can operate with very little surplus, but firms that invest heavily in NAIC-5 and NAIC-6 bonds must have higher levels of surplus (RBC requirements are higher). Thus, even if an insurer does not face out and out prohibitions on investments in speculative-grade bonds, fear of failure to meet RBC requirements may motivate the insurer to sell its fallen angels shortly after losing investment-grade status.
In addition, life insurers may feel forced to sell fallen angels because of the impact they have on the firm's reputation. For example, Fenn and Cole [1993] and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Gilson [1994] provide evidence that policyholder perceptions of portfolio risk are extremely important determinants of market share and profitability in the life insurance industry. Thus, if policyholders are skittish about insurers whose portfolios seem too risky, then insurers may choose to follow a strategy of selling fallen angels when they are downgraded.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that any state regulations or internal investment policies would require that a fallen angel be sold immediately after being downgraded, as selling at a fire sale price may be even more damaging to the firm. Consequently, we wonder just how much pressure there is to sell fallen angels, let alone whether such pressure is sufficient to exacerbate the fallout, as the New York Times claims, or to generate the excess returns found on fallen angel bonds. Our goal in this paper is to investigate insurance company sales of bonds that were downgraded to junk in order to document the extent of forced selling of fallen angels.
Examining insurance company buy and sell trades over the period from 1995 to 2006, we find evidence for the claim that insurance firms are forced to sell fallen angels.
We find that insurance companies are indeed more likely to sell fallen angels following the ratings downgrade than comparable bonds that did not experience a corresponding downgrade. For example, our multivariate regression analysis indicates that fallen angels experience nearly one and a half more sales transactions in the month following a rating downgrade than comparable bonds. However, we do not conclude that there is a stampede to sell off these bonds. As has been noted in much of the literature, we find that the overall transaction volume for seasoned bonds is limited. Hence, while one and a half bond sales a month is a huge increase in sales activity compared to bonds that were not downgraded to junk, less than two investors on average divesting their holdings of fallen angels hardly constitutes a rush to the exit.
DATA
We identify fallen angels using the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), which includes detailed information on issuance and ratings for all fixed income securities that are assigned a CUSIP, or are likely to receive one soon. FISD is sold by Therefore, all else constant, fallen angels would be likely to trade less than some other bonds simply because bonds rarely get downgraded immediately after issuance (see Frydman, Hanson, and Schuerman [2005] ). Bond trading is also related to the face value of the bond (see Crabbe and Turner [1995] ). We control for these features when we consider the impact of fallen angel status on bond sales.
In order to provide a baseline for insurance firm sales activity, we first examine the characteristics of all bonds sold by insurance firms. We utilize four methods for measuring bond selling activity: (1) the average number of times a bond is sold in a month; (2) the relative dollar value of the amount sold -calculated as the amount sold divided by the bond's offering amount; (3) the average number of monthly net sales transactions, where net sales refers to sell transactions less buy transactions; and (4) the average relative dollar value of the net sale amount -calculated as the net amount sold divided by the bond's offering amount. To illustrate how the sale measures are calculated, consider a bond with an offering amount of $100 that had two sales for $10 and $20, respectively, and one buy for $45 in a particular month. First, the number of sales in the month is two. Second, the relative amount sold is 30 percent. 9 Third, the net sales activity for the month equals one. 10 Finally, the relative net amount sold is -15 percent.
11 Examining these four measures should provide a comprehensive picture of bond trading by insurance firms.
Exhibits 3 through 8 provide an overview of bond trading activity at insurance companies. Overall, the exhibits show that this activity is very small. For example, Exhibit 3 is a graph of the average monthly sales transactions for the bonds in our sample over the entire time period that they are in the sample. The graph also shows the sales of fallen angel bonds in the month after they were downgraded. Neither set of bonds are sold often, reflecting the fact that corporate bonds are not actively traded instruments. In the sample overall the average number of sales transactions is 0.21 per month. The median is even lower (less than 0.02), reflecting the large fraction of the bonds that have no recorded sales transactions by insurance companies at any time during the sample period. Likewise, a large number of fallen angels are not sold by any insurance company in the month after they are downgraded. Among the bonds with a positive monthly average number of sales transactions, most are sold less than once a month. We can see, therefore, that any analysis of insurance firm transactions will necessarily be based on a limited set of activity.
Exhibits 4 through 8 show detailed breakdowns of trading activity for all the bonds in our sample based on bond rating, age, industry group, face value and type of bond. Insurance firm selling activity is more heavily concentrated in the ratings categories near the investment grade/speculative grade cutoff (BBB-/BB+). Exhibit 5 provides a breakdown of selling activity by bond age. Consistent with Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri [2000] , Warga [1992] and Hotchkiss and Jostova [2007] , we see that selling activity falls off as bonds age. Exhibit 6 shows that bond sales are more common among industrial bonds. Exhibit 6 also shows that overall (across all ratings and bond ages), insurance firms are net buyers of bonds. Examining selling activity based on bond offering size, Exhibit 7 shows that transactions (both selling and buying) are concentrated in the largest bond size categories. For example, bonds in the largest offering amount size category average 1.3 transactions per month where as bonds in the smallest size category average less than 0.02 transactions per month.
Finally, we examine selling activity based on whether bonds are corporate debentures or medium term notes. Exhibit 8 shows that the majority of selling activity occurs among the former.
EVIDENCE OF FORCED SELLING OF FALLEN ANGELS
As trading in the NAIC database is fairly light, a fair comparison of fallen angel sales should involve bonds with similar characteristics. We compare the trading activity over the month and quarter after the downgrade for the two sets of bonds. We also consider the trading activity over the time period between the downgrade date and the end of the calendar year of the downgrade, as it is likely that forced selling, if it exists, would put pressure on the firm to sell the fallen angel in advance of the insurer's annual report.
12
To compare the trading activity of fallen angels with similar bonds, we create a matched sample using the following criteria: For each fallen angel, we find bonds that (1) are in the same industry group, (2) have the same rating, (3) have an offer amount that is between 75 percent and 125 percent of the fallen angel's offer amount, and (4) were issued within one year of the fallen angel's issue date. Based on these criteria, we identify matching bonds for 1,545 out of the 1,881 fallen angels identified using two rating agencies. In order to increase the number of bonds included in the analysis, we relax the matching criteria for the remaining 336 fallen angels in the following sequence:
First, we expand the rating requirement to the broad rating group (e.g. BB+, BB, and BBare one rating group) and match 107 additional fallen angels. Second, for the remaining 229 fallen angels we replace the offering amount match criteria with three broad categories: (1) offering amounts less than $50 million, (2) offering amounts between $50 million and $150 million, and (3) offering amounts greater than $150 million. 13 This rule nets an additional 197 fallen angels. For the remaining 32 fallen angels, we drop the requirement that the bonds come from the same industry group, resulting in a pick-up of 25 fallen angels. Finally, for the last 7 fallen angels, we ignore the offering amount match requirement, thus including 3 additional fallen angels in the analysis. Based on these criteria, we are able to study 1,877 fallen angels with corresponding control bonds, or a dataset containing 53,804 total observations. We follow the same matching scheme for the set of 1,228 fallen angels identified using four rating agencies (Moody's, S&P, Fitch, and DCR). Based on these criteria, we are able to study 1,266 fallen angels with corresponding control bonds, or a dataset containing 42,981 total observations.
In Exhibits 9 and 10 we compare the sales activity of fallen angels to that of the matched bond sample. Exhibit 9 reports the results for the fallen angels identified using
Moody's and S&P ratings and Exhibit 10 shows the results for fallen angels identified using the four rating agencies. The results show that by all measures and in all time periods sales are significantly larger for the fallen angel sample. Thus, despite the large number of fallen angels that remain in insurers' portfolios after the downgrade (as the "no trades" bar in Exhibit 3 indicates) the ones that are sold after the downgrade involve far more transactions than is typical for a corporate bond, even controlling for characteristics of bonds that affect their trading activity.
Exhibits 11 and 12 show the estimated coefficients for the regressions of trading activity among fallen angels and the set of matched bonds. Exhibit 11 reports the results using Moody's and S&P ratings and Exhibit 12 shows the results for fallen angels identified using the four rating agencies. As the results are qualitatively the same, we will confine our discussion to Exhibit 11. The exhibits show the estimated coefficients for the regressions where the dependent variable is the number of sales transactions (columns 1 and 2), and the number of net sales (columns 3 and 4). In each regression, we include as control variables the natural log of the bond offering amount, the natural log of the bond age at downgrade, a dummy variable denoting whether the bond is a debenture (as opposed to a medium term note), the natural log of the bond's numerical rating (larger numbers are associated with lower credit quality), the natural log of the bond's maturity, and dummy variables for firms in the industrial or financial industries. Our regression specification also includes the natural log of the number of the downgrades in each month to capture overall credit market conditions and thus the possibility that insurance firms have greater bond sales activity during months with large numbers of bond downgrades.
Our main variable of interest is a dummy variable denoting whether the bond is a fallen angel. If the estimated coefficient on this fallen angel indicator is significantly positive then we have evidence that forced selling of fallen angels occurs in the insurance industry. In the second model specification (columns 2 and 4), we add three dummy variables to denote fallen angels that were downgraded by 2 notches, 3 notches, and 4 or more notches, respectively. These dummy variables isolate sales activity that might occur due to regulatory pressure on insurance companies to limit their holdings of deeply downgraded bonds. Looking first at the simple count of sales transactions (columns 1 and 2), we see that bond characteristics that we mentioned earlier have a significant impact on sales activity. Larger bonds and lower rated bonds are sold more frequently while older bonds and longer maturity bonds are sold less often. In addition, we find a significant and positive coefficient for the number of bond downgrades, implying that insurance companies do sell more bonds in periods when credit quality is declining.
Do insurance companies actively sell fallen angels? The indicator variable for fallen angels is positive and significant with a value of nearly 1.5 (column 1). This implies that fallen angels have nearly 1.5 more sales transactions in the month following a downgrade than similar bonds that were not downgraded from the investment grade category. To put this into perspective, the control bonds averaged only 0.04 sales transactions per month, or about one sale for every 25 bonds in the group. Thus, the fallen angel bonds clearly experienced substantially greater sales activity than the sample of comparable bonds.
In the second specification (column 2), we added the dummy variables denoting the number of rating notches the fallen angels fell. The coefficients on these variables suggest that sales activity increases for fallen angel bonds that experience large rating downgrades. For example, the coefficient for fallen angels downgraded 3 notches implies that these bonds had 1.110 more sales than bonds that were downgraded only 1 notch and 2.165 more sales than the control bonds. 14 The finding of greater sales activity for deeper downgraded bonds is consistent with insurance companies experiencing greater regulatory pressure to sell riskier bonds. However, the regressions reported here are affected by the large presence of bonds that do not trade at all. Correcting for this problem with a Tobit (unreported results) shows equally strong support for our results on fallen angels as a group, but much weaker evidence vis-à-vis the effects of being downgraded many notches.
Our other regression specifications also have fallen angel indicator variables that are positive and significant at the one percent level. The fallen angel coefficient in column 3 indicates that fallen angels experience almost one whole net sale (sales minus buys) more in the month after downgrade than the control set. As noted previously, relatively few bonds trade in any given period and thus the finding of one additional net sale over the control group actually represents a substantial increase in sales activity.
Do abnormally high fallen angel sales imply that insurance companies are dumping fallen angels as predicted by the New York Times? The answer to this question depends upon one's viewpoint of the relative magnitude of bond trading activity. The univariate and regression analyses clearly show that fallen angels have greater selling activity than comparable corporate bonds, and this sales activity appears to be the result of regulatory pressure on insurance firms to limit their holdings of non-investment grade debt. However, as previously discussed, overall trading activity by insurance companies is very low. Thus, it is not clear that insurance companies face regulatory pressure to liquidate their holdings of fallen angels. As noted from the graph in Exhibit 3, only about 35% of fallen angel bonds are sold by insurance companies to any extent in the month after the downgrade. In addition, the dollar amount of these sales only totals 1.2% of the face value of the fallen angels. As insurance companies own a large fraction of the outstanding face value of the corporate bond market, their sales activities appear trivial.
To put the 1.2% figure into sharper perspective, consider that net purchases of fallen angels (before they were downgraded) reported in the NAIC transaction database amounts to 12% of the fallen angels' aggregate face value. As the database does not include purchases in the primary offering but would include subsequent sales of bonds purchased in the offering, this implies that insurance companies sell no more than 10%
(1.2%/12%) of their holdings of fallen angels as a result of the downgrades. If we consider that insurance companies did purchase issues at origination, then the dollar amount sales activity suggests that insurance companies sell a much smaller percentage of their fallen angel holdings than 10%. As a result, we cannot conclude that insurance companies are dumping fallen angels after downgrading due to regulatory pressure.
CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the often-made assertion that when a company is downgraded to the speculative grade category, large groups of investors sell the firm's debt, without considering whether it is priced appropriately and therefore potentially at a loss. The logic behind this story is that regulations and conservative investment policies put pressure on these investors to sell bonds just because they are no longer investment grade.
Our study does not support the hypothesis that institutional investors are required to liquidate their holdings of fallen angels. First, we find that overall sales transaction volume for seasoned bonds is very limited. For example, we find that the average number of sales transactions per month for BBB-rated bonds is 0.29 (less than one-third of a bond) and the average number of transactions per month for bonds that are more than five years old is less than 0.25 bonds. As a result, any selling activity, however small, could lead to significant statistical findings of greater sales transactions for fallen angels.
However, given the limited trading activity in seasoned bonds, insurance companies are far more active in selling fallen angels following the ratings downgrades than comparable bonds. Nonetheless, this increased sales activity for fallen angels represents a small portion of the overall holdings of fallen angels by insurance companies. As a result, our findings are not consistent with the popular perception that regulations force insurance companies to sell off fallen angels, causing further disruptions in the credit markets. 
